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Abstract
A powerful feature of linear sketches is that from sketches of two data vectors, one can compute
the sketch of the difference between the vectors. This allows us to answer fine-grained questions
about the difference between two data sets. In this work we consider how to construct sketches for
weighted F0, i.e., the summed weights of the elements in the data set, that are small, differentially
private, and computationally efficient. Let a weight vector w ∈ (0, 1]u be given. For x ∈ {0, 1}u we
are interested in estimating ‖x ◦ w‖1 where ◦ is the Hadamard product (entrywise product).
Building on a technique of Kushilevitz et al. (STOC 1998), we introduce a sketch (depending on
w) that is linear over GF(2), mapping a vector x ∈ {0, 1}u to Hx ∈ {0, 1}τ for a matrix H sampled
from a suitable distribution H. Differential privacy is achieved by using randomized response, flipping
each bit of Hx with probability p < 1/2. That is, for a vector ϕ ∈ {0, 1}τ where Pr[(ϕ)j = 1] = p
independently for each entry j, we consider the noisy sketch Hx + ϕ, where the addition of noise
happens over GF(2). We show that for every choice of 0 < β < 1 and ε = O(1) there exists p < 1/2
and a distribution H of linear sketches of size τ = O(log2(u)ε−2β−2) such that:
1. For random H ∼ H and noise vector ϕ, given Hx+ ϕ we can compute an estimate of ‖x ◦w‖1
that is accurate within a factor 1 ± β, plus additive error O(log(u)ε−2β−2), with probability
1− 1/u, and
2. For every H ∼ H, Hx+ ϕ is ε-differentially private over the randomness in ϕ.
The special case w = (1, . . . , 1) is unweighted F0. Previously, Mir et al. (PODS 2011) and Kenthapadi
et al. (J. Priv. Confidentiality 2013) had described a differentially private way of sketching unweighted
F0, but the algorithms for calibrating noise to their sketches are not computationally efficient, either
using quasipolynomial time in the sketch size or superlinear time in the universe size u.
For fixed ε the size of our sketch is polynomially related to the lower bound of Ω
(
log(u)β−2
)
bits
by Jayram & Woodruff (Trans. Algorithms 2013). The additive error is comparable to the bound
of Ω (1/ε) of Hardt & Talwar (STOC 2010). An application of our sketch is that two sketches can
be added to form a noisy sketch of the form H(x1 + x2) + (ϕ1 + ϕ2), which allows us to estimate
||(x1 + x2) ◦ w||1. Since addition is over GF(2), this is the weight of the symmetric difference of the
vectors x1 and x2. Recent work has shown how to privately and efficiently compute an estimate for
the symmetric difference size of two sets using (non-linear) sketches such as FM-sketches and Bloom
Filters, but these methods have an error bound of Ω(
√
m¯), where m¯ is an upper bound on ||x1||0 and
||x2||0. In particular, our result improves previous work when β = o
(
1/
√
m¯
)
and log(u)/ε = m¯o(1).
In conclusion our results both improve the efficiency of existing methods for unweighted F0
estimating and extend to a weighted generalization.
1 Introduction
Estimating the number of distinct values in a set (its cardinality), without explicitly enumerating the
set, is a classical and important problem in data management. Sampling-based methods [21] can in
many cases be improved by using algorithms designed with data streams in mind [24]. Streaming
algorithms based on linear sketches can also be used to estimate changes as a data set evolves [26] and
for approximate query processing in large-scale settings [11].
In some settings it is natural to consider weighted cardinalities. Consider, for example, the following
SQL query:
∗This work was supported by Investigator Grant 16582, Basic Algorithms Research Copenhagen (BARC), from the
VILLUM Foundation.
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SELECT *
FROM PERSON P, HOSPITALIZATION H
WHERE P.age = 45 and P.id = H.person_id
The size of the query result is a weighted sum (by number of hospitalizations) over the sets of people
satisfying the predicate P.age = 45. Beyond examples involving joins, weights allow us to more accu-
rately model variable-size data types such as strings. Thus it is of interest to consider weighted versions
of cardinality estimation.
In recent years, privacy of database records has become increasingly important when releasing ag-
gregates from a database. The notion of differential privacy [14] has emerged as the leading approach to
providing rigorous privacy guarantees. It is known that differential privacy comes with pitfalls [27], but
work in the database community has led to privacy-preserving database systems supporting (limited)
SQL, see e.g. [31, 43] and their references. A challenge in such systems is that the set of queries is often
not known ahead of time, so budgeting the disclosure of detailed information is highly nontrivial. An
attractive approach to achieving privacy even when faced with unknown queries is to release a summary,
or sketch, of the data set from which approximate answers to queries can be computed (as a side effect
this also eliminates the need for interaction). In this paper we consider private linear sketches for the
problem of cardinality estimation.
Example. Suppose that the company Acme Corporation runs an employee satisfaction survey once
a year. Management at Acme Corporation made some drastic changes over the past year, and they wish
to analyze the impact of these changes on the employees’ satisfaction. For a specific improvement, every
employee is given a value between 0 and 1, indicating how closely related that improvement is to the
employee’s work life. A survey for each improvement is run by a consultant who delivers a summary
of the results to the management at Acme Corporation. The consultant ensures that the summary is
private, so individual employees cannot be identified from the summary. The management at Acme
Corporation can combine the summary from last year’s survey with the summary from this year’s survey
to estimate the change in satisfaction over the past year, where the vote of an employee is weighted by
the value that employee was given. We note that the summaries should be generated in the same way,
but the choice of consultant may change from year to year.
More formally, we consider two players that hold sets A and B from a universe U = {1, ..., u},
respectively. For every element j ∈ U let a fixed, public weight, wj ∈ (0, 1] be given and for input set
A ⊆ U consider the corresponding weight vector (wA)j = wj · 1[j ∈ A]. The goal is to estimate
the weight of the symmetric difference ‖wA△B‖1, in a differentially private manner. We refer the reader
to Section 3.2 for the basics of differential privacy. We may think of the sets as two lists of employees.
Given input sets A and B, the two players each compute a linear sketch of their own set and add noise
to obtain privacy as described in Section 4. These noisy sketches can be thought of as the summaries.
For input sets A and B, we note that if we, along with the estimate of the weight of the symmetric
difference, have estimates of ‖wA‖1 and ‖wB‖1, then we can also estimate ‖wA∪B‖1, ‖wA∩B‖1, ‖wA\B‖1
and ‖wB\A‖1 as argued in Section 4.3. To make this possible, each player also outputs a differentially
private version of their set weight. We remark that if all weights wj = 1, then the problem reduces to
estimating the set size, F0.
We define and construct a noisy linear sketch over GF(2), the field of size 2, with the following
properties:
• ε-differentially private
• Computationally efficient
• Allows estimating the weight of the symmetric difference with small relative error
• Space usage is polynomially related to the lower bound (for fixed ε)
Previously known results satisfy at most 2 of these properties, see Figure 1 for an overview. We discuss
previous work further in Section 2. Our sketch can be computed and stored for future use, meaning that
two players do not have to be active simultaneously but can compute and publish their sketches when
they are ready. A self-contained description of our linear sketch can be found in Section 4. Readers
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Reference
Diff.
privacy
Additive
error
Relative
error
Initial.
time
Space
usage
Hardt and Talwar [22] ε Ω(1/ε) – – –
McGregor et al. [29] ε Ω˜(
√
m) – – –
Jayram and Woodruff [23] – – 1 + β – Ω˜(1/β2)
Kane et al. [24] – O˜(1) 1 + β O(1) O˜(1/β2)
Mir et al. [34] ε O˜(ε−O(1)β−O(1)) 1 + β exp((εβ)−O(1)) O˜((εβ)−O(1))
Kenthapadi et al. [25] (ε, δ) O˜(1/ε) 1 + β Ω˜(u) O˜(ε−1β−2)∗
Stanojevic et al. [39] ε O˜(
√|A ∪B|/ε2) – Ω(|A|+ |B|) Ω(|A|+ |B|)
This paper ε O˜(ε−2β−2) 1 + β O˜(ε−2β−2) O˜
(
ε−2β−2
)
Figure 1: Selected lower bounds (top part) and upper bounds (bottom part) for estimating the (un-
weighted) size of the symmetric difference m = |A△B| from small sketches of sets A,B ⊆ {1, . . . , u}.
Bounds stated as O˜ and Ω˜ are simplified by suppressing multiplicative factors polynomial in log(1/ε),
log(1/β), log(1/δ), and log u. The non-private bounds in [23, 24] improve previous results by an O˜(1)
factor, we refer to their references for details. ∗ The space usage of [25] is measured in terms of real
numbers; it is unclear how much space a private, discrete implementation would need.
familiar with the sketching literature will realize that our sketch combines a method of Kushilevitz,
Ostrovsky, and Rabani [28] with a standard hashing-based subsampling technique (see, e.g., [44]), and
we use a Randomized Response Technique [42] with noise parameter p(ε), to get ε-differential privacy.
Hence, refer to our sketch as the KOR sketch and to its noisy counterpart as a noisy KOR sketch. We
note that a related, but non-linear and non-private, sketch has previously been used for estimating size
of symmetric difference [36]. From now on we leave out ε in the noise parameter and write simply p.
We show that the KOR sketch is sufficiently robust to noise to allow precise estimation after adding
noise, thus allowing pure differential privacy.
We next give an overview of our techniques, discussed in depth in Section 4. Let U = {1, ..., u} be the
universe from which the input sets are taken. Privacy parameter ε and accuracy parameter β are given,
and a sketch size τ is determined by these parameters. We show in Section 5.2 that we can construct an
ε-differentially private sketch from which we can compute a (1 + β)-approximation for the weight of the
symmetric difference with high probability.
Randomized response [42] is applied to the entire sketch Hx, meaning that each entry of the sketch
is flipped with probability p < 1/2. We show in Section 5.1 how to choose p as a function of ε to ensure
ε-differential privacy for the sketch. Let x ◦ w denote the Hadamard product. Our main theorem is:
Theorem 1 (Noisy KOR sketch). Let w ∈ (0, 1]u be given. For every choice of 0 < β < 1 and ε = O(1)
there exists a distribution H over GF(2)-linear sketches mapping a vector x ∈ {0, 1}u to {0, 1}τ , where
τ = O
(
log2(u)ε−2β−2
)
, and a distribution Nε over noise vectors such that:
1. For H ∼ H and ϕ ∼ Nε, given Hx+ ϕ we can compute, in time O(τ), an estimate wˆ of ‖x ◦ w‖1
that with probability 1− 1/u satisfies |wˆ − ‖x ◦ w‖1| < β‖x ◦ w‖1 +O
(
log(u)ε−2β−2
)
.
2. For every H in the support of H, Hx+ϕ is ε-differentially private over the choice of ϕ ∼ Nε, and
can be computed in time O(‖x‖0 log(u) + τ), including time for sampling ϕ.
The assumption that ε = O(1) is not essential, and is only made to simplify our bounds (which do
not improve for privacy parameter ε = ω(1)).
It is interesting to consider the bound of Theorem 1 in the setting where the goal is to minimize the
error. Choosing the best possible sketch size we achieve an error of O˜((n/ε)2/3), where the O˜ notations
suppresses a polylogarithmic factor. This is polynomially related to known lower bounds described in
section 2.3.
Applications Suppose that Alice holds set A with corresponding characteristic vector xA ∈ {0, 1}u
and Bob holds set B with characteristic vector xB ∈ {0, 1}u. They jointly sample H ∼ H and privately
sample ϕA, ϕB ∼ Nε according to Theorem 1. Then HxA+ϕA and HxB+ϕB are ε-differentially private.
Furthermore, (HxA + ϕB) + (HxB + ϕB) = (HxA + HxB) + (ϕA + ϕB), and we show in Section 4.3
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that ϕA + ϕB ∼ Nε′ with ε′ = ε2/(2 + 2ε). In Section 5.2 we use this in conjunction with Theorem 1
to establish: For accuracy parameter β > 0, consider an ε-differentially private noisy KOR sketch for
a set A and an ε-differentially private noisy KOR sketch for a set B, based on the same linear sketch
H ∼ H, sampled independently of A and B. We can compute an approximation ∆ˆ of the weight of the
symmetric difference, such that with probability 1− 1/u:
|‖wA△B‖1 − ∆ˆ| < β‖wA△B‖1 + poly(1/ε, 1/β, logu) .
In the special case where all weights wj are 1, this reduces to estimating the size of the symmetric
difference A△B.
2 Related Work
In the absence of privacy constraints, seminal estimators for (unweighted) set cardinality that support
merging sketches (to produce a sketch of the union) are HyperLogLog [18], FM-sketches [19], and bottom-
k (aka. k-minimum values) sketches [5]. Progress on making these estimators private for set operations
include [40] (using FM-sketches) and [38], which builds a private cardinality estimator to estimate set
intersection size using the bottom-k sketch. We note that these sketches do not achieve differential
privacy, but are aimed at a weaker notion of privacy. Specifically, they offer a one-sided guarantee that
may reveal that an individual element is not present in the dataset. To our best knowledge, a private
version of HyperLogLog with provable bounds on accuracy has not been described in the literature.
The weighted version of cardinality estimation has been less studied. For (scaled) integer weights in
[W ] there is a simple reduction that inserts element i with weightwi by inserting the tuples (i, 1), . . . , (i, wi)
into a standard cardinality estimator on the domain U×[W ], but this makes the obtained bounds depend
on the number W of possible weights. Cohen et al. [10] showed that the class of cardinality estimators
that rely on extreme order statistics (for example HyperLogLog) can be efficiently extended to the
weighted setting, even for real-numbered weights.
Note that the weighted F0 estimation problem is different from F1 and L1 estimation in the context
of set operations, for example, the union of two identical sets will have the same weighted F0, whereas
summing two identical vectors will produce a vector with twice the L1 norm. In the rest of this section
we focus on the standard, unweighted setting.
2.1 Differentially private cardinality estimators
Already the seminal paper on pan-privacy [15] discusses differentially private streaming algorithms for
F0 on insertion-only streams. Their sketch is not linear and does not allow deletions or subtraction of
sketches. It is not clear if the sketch can be merged to produce a sketch for the union.
Recent work by von Voigt et al. [41] has shown how to estimate the cardinality of a set using less space
in a differentially private manner using FM-sketches, using the Probabilistic Counting with Stochastic
Averaging (PCSA) technique [19]. These sketches can be merged to obtain a sketch for the union of the
input set with a slightly higher level of noise. Privacy is achieved by randomly adding ones to the sketch
and by only sketching a sample of the input dataset.
Bloom Filters have been studied extensively to obtain cardinality estimators under set operations
(already implicit in [15]). Alaggan et al. [2] estimated set intersection size by combining a technique
for computing similarity between sets, represented by Bloom filters in a differentially private manner,
named BLIP (BLoom-then-flIP) filters [1] with a technique for approximating set intersection of two sets
based on their Bloom Filter representation [7]. We note that [1] achieves privacy by flipping each bit of
the Bloom filter with a certain probability, much like the technique we use to get privacy of our sketch.
Stanojevic et al. [39] show how to estimate set intersection, union and symmetric difference for two sets
by computing an estimate for the size of the union, and combined with the size of each set, they show
how to compute an estimate for the size of the intersection and the symmetric difference. They achieve
privacy by flipping each bit with some probability, like in [1]. Also, RAPPOR [17] uses Bloom Filters
with a randomized response technique to collect data from users in a differentially private way but is
mainly aimed at computing heavy hitters.
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Though a bound on the expected worst-case error of privately estimating the size of a symmetric
difference |A△B| (as in Corollary 1) is not stated in any of these papers, an upper bound of O(√m¯),
where m¯ is an upper bound on the size of the sets, follows from the discussion in [39] (for fixed ε).
It seems that this magnitude of error is inherent to approaches using Bloom filters since it arises by
balancing the error related to the noise and the error related to hash collisions in the Bloom filter. An
advantage and special case of our noisy KOR sketch is that it can be used to directly estimate the size
of the symmetric difference, and so the error will depend only on the size of the symmetric difference.
It seems that with non-linear sketches it would be necessary to first estimate the size of the union and
combine this with the size of each input set as exhibited in, for example, [39]. Hence, the error would
depend on the size of the union of the input sets.
2.2 Differentially private sketches
Closely related to our work is the differentially private Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) sketch by Kentha-
padi et al. [25], in which the technique of adding noise to the sketch is also applied. Kenthapadi et
al. add Gaussian noise, so to store and maintain a sketched vector, some kind of discretization would
be needed (not discussed in their paper). Discretizing a real-valued private mechanism is non-trivial:
Without sufficient care, one might lose privacy due to rounding in an implementation, as argued by
Mironov [35]. Even if a suitable discretization of the mechanism in [25] would be possible (see [8] for a
general discussion), it has several drawbacks compared to our method:
• It only achieves approximate differential privacy as opposed to the pure differential privacy of the
noisy KOR sketch.
• The time needed to update the sketch when a set element is inserted or removed is not constant
(in the main method described it is linear in the sketch size).
• The time needed to initialize the sketch is at least O(u), because the noise needs to be calibrated to
the sensitivity of the JL sketch matrix, which requires linear time in the size of the sketch matrix.
Alternatively, which is the suggestion in Kenthapadi et al., the sketch matrix is assumed to have
low sensitivity and noise is calibrated to this sensitivity. If a sketch matrix with a large entry is
randomly chosen, the sensitivity of the sketch matrix is large, in which case the noise does not
ensure privacy. So with a small probability, privacy is not preserved.
Another closely related work is the paper of Mir et al. [34], which also adds a noise vector after
computing standard linear sketches for F0 estimation to make the sketch differentially private. They
further initialize their sketches with random noise vectors to also get pan-privacy. The error bound
obtained is similar to ours, and the sketch has a discrete representation, but their method is inferior in
terms of time complexity. This is because they rely on the exponential mechanism [30], which is not
computationally efficient. (Note that a preprint of the paper of Mir et al. [33] presented a computationally
more efficient method. However, the sensitivity analysis in that paper has an error [37] that was corrected
in the slower method published in [34].)
Our method is more computationally efficient and arguably simpler than the methods of [25, 34].
Our linear sketch is not a replacement for these sketches, though, since our sketch is over GF(2) rather
than the reals (or integers).
A very recent paper by Choi et al. [9], proposes a framework for releasing differentially private
estimates of various sketching problems in a distributed setting. This framework introduces a new way
of adding noise: privacy is achieved by multiplying the estimate with well-chosen noise, thus ensuring
an estimate with only a multiplicative error factor. Each participant computes the sketch of his or her
input, using the same mergeable sketching function, as well as a piece of distributed noise. Applying
secure multi-party computation, the parties compute a noisy estimate from the sketches and the noise.
The technique by Choi et al. does not allow for releasing the sketches from each participant to the public
as these are not private. Further, the results of Choi et al. do not immediately allow for estimating size
or weight of the symmetric difference between two sets.
5
2.3 Lower bounds.
Jayram and Woodruff [23] show that, even with no privacy guarantee, to obtain error probability 1/u
we need a sketch of Ω
(
log(u)β−2
)
bits to estimate F0 with relative error 1± β. It is easy to extend this
lower bound to our setting, in which an additive error of c is allowed: Simply insert each item c times,
to increase the size of the set so that the additive error is negligible. Formally this requires us to extend
the universe to U × {1, . . . , c}, such that the lower bound in terms of the original universe size becomes
Ω
(
log(u/c)β−2
)
. (The reason why we do not use this reduction to eliminate the additive error in our
upper bound is that the reduction increases the sensitivity of updates, destroying the differential privacy
properties.)
Hardt and Talwar [22] show that an ε-differentially private sketch for F0 must have additive error
Ω(1/ε), which is comparable (up to polynomial and logarithmic factors) to the additive error we achieve.
Desfontaines et al. [12] show that it is not possible to preserve privacy in accurate cardinality es-
timators that require idempotence, i.e., that adding additional copies of an existing element must not
change the sketch. It is a necessary requirement for our sketch to work that we are dealing with a set
rather than a multiset (i.e., that there are no “copies” in the input set). They also require that one can
merge several sketches without loss in accuracy. Our sketch will have an increase in noise when merging
sketches, and thus does not satisfy the requirement for cardinality estimators formulated in [12].
McGregor et al. [29] showed that in order to estimate the size of the intersection of two sets A and
B, based on differentially private sketches of A and B, an additive error of Ω(
√
u) is needed in the worst
case when A and B are arbitrary subsets of [u]. The lower bound holds even in an interactive setting
where Alice (holding A) and Bob (holding B) can communicate, and we require that the communication
transcript is differentially private. The hard input distribution uses sets with symmetric difference of
size Θ(u) with high probability.
2.4 Noisy sketching.
In addition to the paper of Mir et al. [34], there is some previous work on sketching techniques in the
presence of noise. Motivated by applications in learning theory, Awasthi et al. [4] considered recovery of
a vector based on noisy 1-bit linear measurements. The resistance to noise demonstrated is analogous to
what we show for the KOR sketch, but technically quite different since the linear mapping is computed
over the reals before a sign operation is applied.
If the sketching matrix H itself is secret and randomly chosen from a distribution over matrices with
entries in a finite field, very strong privacy guarantees on the sketch Hx can be obtained, while still
allowing ‖x‖0 to be estimated from Hx with small error [6]. However, the condition that the sketch
matrix is secret is a serious limitation for applications such as streaming and distributed cardinality
estimation that require H to be stored or shared.
3 Preliminaries
We let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and let U = [u] be the universe that the datasets are taken from.
For a set A ⊆ U , we let xA denote the characteristic vector for A, defined as
(xA)j =
{
1, j ∈ A
0, otherwise .
We write wA (or wxA) for the weight vector for input set A such that
wA = xA ◦ w
for fixed, public weights wj ∈ (0, 1], and ◦ denotes the Hadamard product.
For vector x = (x1, ..., xu) we define ‖x‖p =
(∑u
j=1 x
p
j
)1/p
as the p-norm of x. For p = 0, we define
‖x‖0 =
∑u
j=1 1[xj 6= 0], often called the zero-”norm”. F0 denotes the 0th frequency moment and
represents the number of distinct elements in a stream (or a set). Frequency moments are well-known
from the streaming literature, see for example [3].
Our sketch HxA is comprised of log(u) ”levels”, HixA for
i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1. We refer to Section 4.1 for a description of these levels. Let n denote the size of
the binary vector representation of HixA for each i. Hence, the size of the noisy KOR sketch HxA + ϕ
is τ = n log u. Note that n is fixed and depends on the privacy parameter ε and the accuracy parameter
β.
Finally, we assume that sets and vectors are stored in a sparse representation, such that we can list
the non-zero entries in the input vector x in time O(‖x‖0).
3.1 Hashing-based subsampling
The sketch matrix H is defined by several hash functions. For simplicity, we assume access to an oracle
representing random hash functions, namely, that we can sample a fully random hash function, and it
can be evaluated in constant time. We do not store the hash function as part of our sketch, so the space
for our sketch does not include space required for storing the hash function. We believe it is possible
to replace these hash functions with concrete, efficient hash functions that can be stored in small space
while preserving the asymptotic bounds on accuracy, but in order to focus on privacy aspects, we have
not pursued this direction. Importantly, the differential privacy of our method holds for any choice of
hash function and does not depend on the random oracle assumption.
To ensure that adding two sketches gives a sketch for the symmetric difference, it is necessary that
both players sample the same elements for each Hi. To ensure coordinated sampling, we use a hash
function, so the same elements from U are sampled by both players. We use the following (standard)
subsampling technique: let S be the family of all fully random hash functions from U into [0, 1]. Let
s ∼ S uniformly at random. We sample an element j from the input set at level i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 if
and only if s(j) ∈ (wj/2i+1, wj/2i]. We refer the reader to the survey of Woodruff [44] for more details
on subsampling.
3.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a statistical property of the behavior of a mechanism [14]. The guarantee is that
an adversary who observes the output of a differentially private mechanism will only obtain negligible
information about the presence or absence of a particular item in the input data. Intuitively, a differen-
tially private mechanism is almost insensitive to the presence or absence of a single element, in the sense
that the probability of observing a specific result should be almost the same for any two neighboring
sets.
In Definition 1, we define differential privacy formally in terms of databases. In our application, the
databases are sets, and thus neighboring means that one set is a subset of the other, and their sizes differ
by 1.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [14]). For ε ≥ 0, a randomized mechanism M is said to be ε-
differentially private (or purely differentially private) if for any two neighboring databases, S and T –
i.e., databases differing in a single entry – and for all W ⊆ Range(M) it holds that
Pr
[
M(S) ∈W
]
≤ eε · Pr
[
M(T ) ∈ W
]
.
For ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1], a randomized mechanism M is said to be (ε, δ)-differentially private (or
approximately differentially private) if for any two neighboring databases, S and T , and for all W ⊆
Range(M) it holds that
Pr
[
M(S) ∈ W
]
≤ eε · Pr
[
M(T ) ∈W
]
+ δ.
We show in section 5.1 that our protocol obtains ε-differential privacy.
Our protocol for estimating the weight of the symmetric difference works in the local model of
differential privacy, where each player adds noise to their own sketch. It uses the general technique of
achieving privacy by adding noise according to sensitivity of a function [14]. We note that our sketch
would also work in a model where vectors supplied by the users are combined using a black-box multi-
party secure aggregation [20, 32]. In this setting, only the sketch for the symmetric difference would be
released, and thus, only this sketch would need to be differentially private, meaning that less noise is
required.
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We can use the Laplace mechanism [14] to get differentially private estimates of the weights of the
input sets. These estimates can be used together with an estimate for the weight of the symmetric
difference to compute estimates for the union and the intersection of the two input sets with error that
is of the same magnitude as the error for estimating the symmetric difference. For more details about
differential privacy, we refer the reader to, for example, [16].
4 Techniques
4.1 Sketch Description
In this section, we describe the noisy KOR sketch in detail. The description is self-contained, but we
refer the interested reader to [11] for more background on (linear) sketches. As mentioned, our sketch
combines the techniques from [28] with hashing-based subsampling to achieve a sketch that is robust
against adding noise, as long as we know how much noise was added.
We first give the intuition behind the n× u-matrices Hi, that our sketch H is comprised of: Suppose
that we have a rough estimate Eˆ of ‖w‖1, accurate within a constant factor. Then we can obtain a more
precise estimate by sampling (using a hash function) a fraction n/Eˆ of the elements, for some parameter
n, and computing the sketch from [28] of size n for the sampled elements. This gives an approximation of
the number of sampled elements, which in turn gives an approximation of ‖w‖1 with small relative error.
Since we do not know ‖w‖1 within a constant factor – especially in the setting where we are interested in
the size of the symmetric difference – we use hashing-based subsampling to sample each element j from
the input set with probability wj/2
i+1 for i = 0, . . . , log(u) − 1. Thus for each i, we sample elements
corresponding to approximately a 1/2i+1 fraction of the weight and compute the sketch from [28] of size
n for the sampled elements. For one of these i we are guaranteed to sample approximately a fraction
n/‖w‖1 of the input weight assuming that ‖w‖1 > n. For this i, we can obtain a precise estimate of
‖w‖1 from the sketch.
We now define Hi formally. We first describe the sketch from [28] as a linear sketch over GF(2). Let
F be the family of all hash functions from universe U into [n], and pick h ∼ F uniformly at random.
The hash function h uniquely defines an n× u-matrix K, where
Kk,j =
{
1, if h(j) = k
0, otherwise .
We combine this with the following sampling technique:
Let S be the family of all hash functions from U to [0, 1]. Sample s ∼ S uniformly at random. The
hash function s defines a u× u-diagonal matrix Si for each i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1, defined by
(Si)j,j =
{
1, if s(j) ∈ (wj/2i+1, wj/2i]
0, otherwise .
The matrix-vector product Six represents subsample of input vector x, where we sample each element
with probability wj/2
i+1.
We are finally ready to define Hi as Hi = KSi, which is an n× u-matrix over GF(2). By definition:
(Hi)k,j =
{
1, (h(j) = k) ∧ (s(j) ∈ (wj/2i+1, wj/2i])
0, otherwise .
The KOR sketch can be represented as an n log(u)× u-matrix H , formed by stacking H1, ..., Hlog(u).
Let Nε be a distribution over vectors from {0, 1}n log(u), where each entry is 1 independently with
probability p. We show in Section 5.2 that it suffices to set p = 1/(2 + ε). Sample the noise (or
pertubation) vector ϕ ∼ Nε independently and uniformly at random. The noisy KOR sketch of x is then
computed (over GF(2)) as:
Hx+ ϕ.
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4.2 Estimation
Next, we describe how to compute a weight estimate from a sketch Hx+ ϕ. Let w be the weight vector
associated with x. Let ϕi be the restriction of ϕ to the entries that are added to Hix when adding ϕ to
Hx. To compute an estimate for ‖w‖1, for each i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 count the number of 1s in Hix+ϕi,
Zi = ‖Hix+ ϕi‖0 and compute the interval:
Ii =
[
2in ln
(
1
2/ε+1
1− 2Zi(1+γ)n
)
, 2in ln
(
1
2/ε+1
1− 2Zi(1−γ)n
)]
(1)
where γ < β−1/n7e3(2/ε+1) . Compute the intersection I =
⋂log(u)−1
i=0 Ii and check if the maximum value in I is
within a factor (1 + η) of the minimum value in I for
η =
6γ
(
e3
(
2
ε + 1
)− 1)
1 + γ − 2γ (e3 ( 2ε + 1)) .
If that is the case, every element in I is a good estimate for ‖w‖1 (having relative error at most (1 + β))
with high probability. Otherwise, ‖w‖1 is small with high probability, and we let the estimate for ‖w‖1
be 0. We analyze the accuracy of this estimator in Section 5.
4.3 Application to symmetric difference
In this section, we describe a differentially private protocol to compute an estimate for the weight of the
symmetric difference between sets held by two parties. First, we show that the sum of two noisy KOR
sketches, HxA+ϕ and HxB+ψ, is a noisy KOR sketch for the symmetric difference, H(xA△B)+(ϕ+ψ),
which has the same properties as HxA + ϕ and HxB + ψ, but for ε
′ < ε as more noise is added.
Lemma 1. Adding two noisy KOR sketches with perturbation vectors ϕ ∼ Nε and ψ ∼ Nε, respectively,
will yield a noisy KOR sketch for the symmetric difference of the input sets with noise ϕ+ ψ ∼ Nε′ for
ε′ = ε2/(2 + 2ε).
Proof. Let xA and xB be the input vectors from each of the two players. Let H be as defined in
Section 4.1, and define ϕ, ψ as the noise vectors for the noisy KOR sketches for xA and xB, respectively.
We have (over GF(2)) that
(HxA + ϕ) + (HxB + ψ) = (HxA +HxB) + (ϕ+ ψ)
= H(xA + xB) + (ϕ+ ψ) .
This is exactly the noisy KOR sketch for the symmetric difference with perturbation ϕ+ ψ. Note that
we observe a 1 in an entry of ϕ+ ψ with probability p′ = p(1 − p) + (1 − p)p = 2p(1 − p). We show in
Section 5.2 that we can let p = 12+ε . Observe that
p′ =
1
2 + ε′
=
2
2 + ε
(
1− 1
2 + ε
)
which implies that ε′ = ε2/(2 + 2ε).
By Lemma 1 we can treat a sketch for the symmetric difference exactly like a sketch for input vector
x although with a different privacy parameter ε′. Hence, Theorem 1 gives us Corollary 1, restated here
for convenience:
For accuracy parameter β > 0, consider an ε-differentially private noisy KOR sketch for a set A
and an ε-differentially private noisy KOR sketch for a set B, based on the same linear sketch H ∼ H,
sampled independently of A and B. We can compute an approximation ∆ˆ of the weight of the symmetric
difference, such that with probability 1− 1/u:
|‖wA△B‖1 − ∆ˆ| < β‖wA△B‖1 + poly(1/ε, 1/β, logu) .
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Note that the additive error in Corollary 1 still depends polynomially on ε even for privacy parameter
ε′, which is explained by the fact that ε′ = ε2/(2 + 2ε).
Finally, we assumed that ‖wA‖1 and ‖wB‖1 were released with Laplacian noise, which gives an
expected additive error of O(1/ε) for each of ‖wA‖1 and ‖wB‖1 [14]. We can use the following equations
to get estimates for the union, intersection and difference:
‖wA∪B‖1 = ‖wA‖1 + ‖wB‖1 + ‖wA△B‖1
2
,
‖wA∩B‖1 = ‖wA‖1 + ‖wB‖1 − ‖wA△B‖1
2
‖wA\B‖1 = ‖wA‖1 + ‖wA△B‖1 − ‖wB‖1
2
.
That is, the error is bounded by half the error of the estimate of the symmetric difference size plus
O(1/ε).
5 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we give a proof of Theorem 1, restated here for convenience:
Theorem 1 (Noisy KOR sketch). Let w ∈ (0, 1]u be given. For every choice of 0 < β < 1 and ε = O(1)
there exists a distribution H over GF(2)-linear sketches mapping a vector x ∈ {0, 1}u to {0, 1}τ , where
τ = O
(
log2(u)ε−2β−2
)
, and a distribution Nε over noise vectors such that:
1. For H ∼ H and ϕ ∼ Nε, given Hx+ ϕ we can compute, in time O(τ), an estimate wˆ of ‖x ◦ w‖1
that with probability 1− 1/u satisfies |wˆ − ‖x ◦ w‖1| < β‖x ◦ w‖1 +O
(
log(u)ε−2β−2
)
.
2. For every H in the support of H, Hx+ϕ is ε-differentially private over the choice of ϕ ∼ Nε, and
can be computed in time O(‖x‖0 log(u) + τ), including time for sampling ϕ.
5.1 Noise level and Differential Privacy Guarantees
We first show that the noisy KOR sketch Hx + ϕ satisfies ε-differential privacy, which proves part 2
of Theorem 1. Intuitively, removal/insertion of a single element can change only a single entry in the
sketch, as the element is inserted into only a single level. Additionally, the weights are in (0, 1] – that is,
our estimator has sensitivity 1. By the postprocessing property of differential privacy, it suffices to show
that HxA + ϕ is differentially private.
Lemma 2. If p ∈
(
1
eε+1 ,
1
2
)
then Hx+ ϕ is ε-differentially private.
Proof. Let A and B be two neighboring input sets with corresponding characteristic vectors, xA and xB ,
where neighboring means that one set is a subset of the other and the sizes differ by 1. By symmetry
of differential privacy, we can without loss of generality assume that A is the smaller set. Assume that
B\{z} = A, so z is the single element that appears in B but not in A. The element z can only affect
Hix for i where z is sampled. If z is never sampled, then HxA = HxB and privacy is trivial. So assume
i ∈ {0, ..., log(u)− 1} such that s(z) ∈ (wz/2i+1, wz/2i]. We limit our attention to HixA +ϕi, where we
can think of ϕi as the restriction of the n log(u)-dimensional random vector ϕ ∼ Nε to the entries that
would be added to HixA when adding ϕ to HxA. We show that HixA + ϕi is ε-differentially private.
This implies that the entire sketch, HxA + ϕ, is ε-differentially private.
Inserting z into the sketch implies that HixA and HixB will differ in exactly one entry, i.e., ‖HixA+
HixB‖0 = 1. Fix a noisy sketch, Si. There exist unique vectors ϕi and ψi, such that Si = HixA + ϕi =
HixB+ψi. Note that ‖ϕi−ψi‖0 = 1. Let ‖ϕi‖0 = r. Then ‖ψi‖0 = r′ for r′ ∈ {r+1, r−1}. Conditioned
on ‖ϕi‖0 = r and ‖ψi‖0 = r′, the probabilities of randomly drawing exactly these randomness vectors
are, respectively:
(1− p)n−rpr and (1− p)n−r′pr′ .
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Let ε = O(1) be given. By Section 3.2 it is enough to show that for any fixed output Si = HixA +
ϕi = HixB + ψi, we have
e−ε ≤ Pr
[
observe Si from A
]
Pr
[
observe Si from B
] = Pr
[
observe HixA + ϕi from A
]
Pr
[
observe HixB + ψi from B
] ≤ eε.
where the probability is over the randomness in ϕi and ψi. The sketches for A and B are computed
using the same Hi, so the choice of Hi has no impact.
Hence, to obtain differential privacy it suffices that for every possible value of r and r′ ∈ {r+1, r−1}
e−ε ≤ (1 − p)
n−rpr
(1− p)n−r′pr′ =
1
(1− p)r−r′pr′−r ≤ e
ε,
which is satisfied for 1/2 > p ≥ 1/ (eε + 1), since p < 1/2 by assumption.
5.2 Bounding accuracy
In this section, along with Section 5.3, we prove the first part of Theorem 1. Let an input vector x be
given and define w to be the corresponding weight vector. We will mainly consider each Hix isolated,
so let ϕi be the n-dimensional (binary) randomness vector as described in the proof of Lemma 2. First,
we state two useful lemmas.
Lemma 3. For each i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 let Li = ‖Hix‖0 and Zi = ‖Hix+ ϕi‖0. Then:
E
h∼F ,
s∼S
[Li] =
n
2

1−∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
) (2)
E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi] =
n
2

1− (1− 2p)∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
) (3)
Proof. We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for the proof.
Lemma 4. For i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 let Zi = ‖Hix + ϕi‖0. For any 0 < γ < 1, we have with probability
at least 1− 6 log(u)e− γ
2p3n
62·3 that for all i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 simultaneously:
(1 − γ) E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi] < Zi < (1 + γ) E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi].
Proof. We refer the reader to Appendix A.2 for the proof.
First, we consider the case when 1 < n < ‖w‖1. In Lemma 5 we state that in this case, with high
probability we get an error of at most a factor (1 + β) for a well-chosen γ, where γ is a function of the
privacy parameter ε, the accuracy parameter β and the size of the universe, u. For convenience, define
Ii(p) =
[
2in ln
(
1− 2p
1− 2Zi(1+γ)n
)
, 2in ln
(
1− 2p
1− 2Zi(1−γ)n
)]
(4)
and wˆ := 2in ln
(
1/
∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
))
. We prove our result in two steps:
1. If wˆ ∈ Ii(p) for all i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1, then there is some i such that any value from (4) estimates
wˆ up to a factor (1 + η), where η is a function of γ and ε.
2. ‖w‖1 ≤ wˆ ≤
(
1 + 12in
) ‖w‖1 for each i. Specifically, ‖w‖1 ≤ wˆ ≤ (1 + 1n) ‖w‖1 for all i.
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Hence, we choose γ independent of i such that (1 + η)
(
1 + 1n
) ≤ (1 + β) for at least one of the
intervals Ii(p). We pick γ to work for the i where ‖w‖1/(2in) ∈ [1, 2) as this corresponds to having an
input of size between n and 2n (we obtain this input size by the sampling from x in Hi). If ‖w‖1 ≥ n,
there is such an i, and we can identify it by checking that the endpoints of the interval are sufficiently
close together, as described in Section 4.2. We consider the case when ‖w‖1 < n in Section 5.3 where we
show that in this case, the error is bounded by an additive factor of O(n).
Lemma 5. Assume ‖w‖1 > n > 1, and β > 1n . With probability at least 1− 6 log(u)e−
γ2p3n
108 there exists
an i ∈ {0, ..., log(u)− 1} such that any element from Ii(p) is a (1 + β)-approximation to ‖w‖1 for
γ <
(
β − 1n
)
(1− 2p)
7e3
.
Specifically, i where ‖w‖12in ∈ [1, 2), gives these guarantees.
Proof Sketch. We give an informal sketch of the proof and refer the reader to Appendix A.3 for the
formal proof. Define
wˆ := 2in ln
(
1∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
)
.
From Lemma 3, we have ∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
=
1− 2E[Zi]n
1− 2p .
Assume that the bounds in Lemma 4 are satisfied. We remove this assumption shortly. By the bounds
in Lemma 4, wˆ ∈ Ii(p) for all i. We show that wˆ is contained in an interval, which is slightly bigger
than Ii(p) whenever ‖w‖1/(2in) ∈ [1, 2) and show that the endpoints of this interval are within a factor
(1 + η) of each other, where η is a function of γ. Clearly, then Ii(p) is also sufficiently small for this
i. Denote this interval I∗i (p). Any element from I
∗
i (p) is a (1 + η)-approximation to wˆ. Removing the
assumption that the bounds in Lemma 4 hold, we simply get a small error probability and conclude that
with probability at least 1 − 6 log(u)e−γ2p3n/108 we have wˆ ∈ Ii(p) for all i, and thus any value from
I∗i (p) is a (1 + η) estimation to wˆ with high probability. Observing that ‖w‖1 < wˆ ≤
(
1 + 1n
) ‖w‖1
for any i, we choose γ in terms of β such that (1 + η)
(
1 + 1n
)
< (1 + β). Then any value from I∗i (p) is a
(1+β)-approximation for ‖w‖1. We formally choose γ in Appendix A.3. We remark that the assumption
‖w‖1/(2in) ∈ [1, 2) allows us to choose γ independent of i, such that we can compute Ii(p) for all i with
a single value of γ.
Observing that 12+ε >
1
eε+1 for ε > 0, we let p = 1/ (2 + ε) and observe that for Ii := Ii (1/ (2 + ε))
with the choice of γ described in Lemma 5, we get the interval Ii in (1).
5.3 Putting things together
In this section we consider the accuracy in the remaining case where ‖w‖1 ≤ n. We also analyze the
running time. Combining with Section 5.1 this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Note that if ε > 1, we can start our protocol by dividing ε by a suitable constant, c such that
ε′ = ε/c < 1. Changing ε by a constant will change our bounds by a constant factor as well. Hence, we
can without loss of generality assume ε < 1. We can also, without loss of generality, assume u > 10 –
this will at most increase the failure probability and space by a constant factor.
We first show a sufficient upper bound on the sketch size τ = n log u. Observe that p > 1/4 and let
cγ = 7e
3 be a constant. Then we want e−
γ2p3n
108 < 1/u2 as this ensures a failure probability of at most
6 log(u)/u2 < 1/u. Noting that
(1− 2p)2 =
(
1− 2
2 + ε
)2
=
(
1
2/ε+ 1
)2
=
1
4/ε2 + 4/ε+ 1
>
ε2
20
,
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we have
e−
γ2p3n
108 < e−

 (β−
1
n)(1−2p)
7e3


2
n/43
108 = e
−
(β− 1n )
2
(
1
(2/ε+1)2
)
n
43·c2γ ·108
< e
−
(β− 1n )
2
ε2n
20·43c2γ ·108 < 1/u2
when letting n = O
(
log(u)β−2ε−2
)
.
Hence, the size of the sketch is
τ = log(u) · n = O
(
log2(u)
ε2β2
)
.
Note that this n satisfies the requirement β > 1/n from Lemma 5.
We argue about the error: Note that if ‖w‖1 ≥ n, then if one of the intervals Ii is sufficiently small
and wˆ ∈ Ii for all i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1, then wˆ ∈ I =
⋂log(u)−1
i=0 Ii and I is also sufficiently small to give
the wanted estimate. So by Lemma 5, we can check if the endpoints of I are within a factor at most
(1 + η) of each other, and if so, with probability 1 − 1/u any value from I is within a factor (1 + β) of
‖w‖1. If I is too big, then none of the intervals Ii was sufficiently small implying that our assumption
that ‖w‖1/(2in) ∈ [1, 2) does not hold for any i. Hence, with probability 1− 1/u we have ‖w‖1 < n. We
refer to the formal proof in Appendix A.3 for the details. Our protocol sets the estimate of ‖w‖1 to 0
leading to an additive error of O(n) when I was too big. This means that we get an additive error of at
most n = O
(
log(u)β−2ε−2
)
, as required.
Finally, we comment on the running times: For the first part of Theorem 1, we note that in order to
compute the estimate, we need to count the number of ones in Hix + ϕi for each i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1,
compute the intervals Ii and their intersection and check if it is sufficiently small. Counting the number
of ones in all Hix + ϕi is the bottleneck and requires time O(τ). For the second part of Theorem 1,
note that we can initialize the randomness vector ϕ in time O(τ) and we can hash vector x in time
O (‖x‖0 log(u)) assuming that we can iterate over x in time O(‖x‖0).
Combining with Lemma 5 and Lemma 2, we have completed the proof of Theorem 1.
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A Omitted proofs
A.1 Expectations
Lemma 3. For each i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 let Li = ‖Hix‖0 and Zi = ‖Hix+ ϕi‖0. Then:
E
h∼F ,
s∼S
[Li] =
n
2

1−∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
) (2)
E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi] =
n
2

1− (1− 2p)∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
) (3)
Proof. Let A be the input set with corresponding weight vector w. Let vi ∈ Zn≥0 be a vector such that
for each k ∈ [n]
(vi)k =
∑
j∈A
1
[
s(j)
wj
∈ (1/2i+1, 3/2i+1]] · 1 [h(j) = k] .
That is, each entry (vi)k is the number of candidates for entry k in the sketch at level i, i.e., the number
of items j that hash to k and satisfy s(j)wj ∈
(
1/2i+1, 3/2i+1
]
. Since s(j) is uniform,
Pr
s∼S
[
s(j) ∈ (wj/2i+1, 2wj/2i+1]] = 1
2
.
and so, by the principle of deferred decisions that we have for i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1
Pr
h∼F
s∼S
[(HixA)k = 1 | (vi)k 6= 0] = 1
2
,
Pr
h∼F
s∼S
[(HixA)k = 1 | (vi)k = 0] = 0.
As
Pr
s∼S
[
s(j)
wj
∈ (1/2i+1, 3/2i+1]] = Pr
s∼S
[
s(j) ∈ (wj/2i+1, 3wj/2i+1]] = 1
2i
,
we have
Pr
h∼F
s∼S
[(vi)k 6= 0] = 1−
∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
.
We conclude that
Pr
h∼F ,
s∼S
[(HixA)k = 1] =
1−∏j∈A (1− wj2in)
2
.
and letting Li =
∑n
k=1(HixA)k, we get
E
h∼F ,
s∼S
[Li] =
n
2

1−∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
We similarly compute an expression for Eh∼F ,s∼S,ϕi∼Np [Zi]. Let ϕi be the restriction of a randomness
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vector ϕ ∼ Nε to the entries that are added to HixA when adding ϕ to HxA. We see that
Pr
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[
(HixA + ϕi)k = 1
]
= Pr
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[
(HixA + ϕi)k = 1 | (HixA)k = 1
]
· Pr
h∼F ,
s∼S
[
(HixA)k = 1
]
+ Pr
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[
(HixA + ϕi)k = 1 | (HixA)k = 0
]
· Pr
h∼F ,
s∼S
[
(HixA)k = 0
]
= (1− p) · Pr
h∼F ,
s∼S
[
(HixA)k = 1
]
+ p · Pr
h∼F ,
s∼S
[
(HixA)k = 0
]
= (1− p) · 1
2

1−∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)+ p ·
(
1− 1−
∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
2
)
=
1
2
−
(
1
2
− p
)∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
showing that
E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi] =
n
2

1− (1− 2p)∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
) .
A.2 Concentration bounds
Lemma 4. For i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 let Zi = ‖Hix + ϕi‖0. For any 0 < γ < 1, we have with probability
at least 1− 6 log(u)e− γ
2p3n
62·3 that for all i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 simultaneously:
(1 − γ) E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi] < Zi < (1 + γ) E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi].
Before proving Lemma 4, we mention the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Let Li = ‖HixA‖0. For any 0 < γ′ < 1, we have with probability at least 1− 4 log(u)e−2γ′2n
E
h∼F ,
s∼S
[Li]− 2γ′n ≤ Li ≤ E
h∼F ,
s∼S
[Li] + 2γ
′n
for all i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 simultaneously.
Proof. Let A be the input set and w the corresponding weight vector. Let vi ∈ Zn≥0 be a vector such
that for each k ∈ [n]
(vi)k =
∑
j∈A
1
[
s(j)
wj
∈ (1/2i+1, 3/2i+1]] · 1 [h(j) = k]
so (vi)k is the number of candidates for entry k in the sketch at level i. Let Vi = ‖vi‖0 =
∑n
k=1 1[(vi)k 6=
0]. Vi is a sum of negatively associated random variables (for definition and argument see Section 4.1 in
[13]), so by Theorem 4.3 in [13], we can use the Hoeffding bound to see that with probability at least
1− 2e−2nγ′2 we have for any i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1
E[Vi]− γ′n ≤ Vi ≤ E[Vi] + γ′n. (5)
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Let Li = ‖HixA‖0 =
∑n
k=1(HixA)k denote the number of ones in the linear sketch. For fixed Vi, Li is a
sum of independent random variables with (by the principle of deferred decisions)
Pr
[
(HixA)k = 1 | (vi)k 6= 0
]
=
1
2
, Pr
[
(HixA)k = 1 | (vi)k = 0
]
= 0.
So for any fixed Vi = t
E
[
Li | Vi = t
]
=
t
2
. (6)
Furthermore, as Li is a sum of independent random variables for a fixed choice of Vi, we can use the
Hoeffding bound: with probability at least 1− 2e−2nγ′2
E
[
Li | Vi = t
]
− γ′n ≤ Li|Vi=t ≤ E
[
Li | Vi = t
]
+ γ′n,
where Li|Vi=t means the value of Li when we assume that Vi = t. Combining this with (5) and (6) a
union bound gives with probability at least 1− 4e−2nγ′2
E[Vi]− γ′n
2
− γ′n ≤ Li ≤ E[Vi] + γ
′n
2
+ γ′n. (7)
Simultaneously, (5) and (6) gives
E[Vi]− γ′n
2
≤ E[Li] ≤ E[Vi] + γ
′n
2
, (8)
which implies
2 E[Li]− γ′n ≤ E[Vi] ≤ 2E[Li] + γ′n. (9)
Note that in the union bound from (7), we already assumed that (5) was satisfied, so (9) is trivially
satisfied under the union bound without changing the probability guarantees. Hence, inserting (9) into
(7), we have
2E[Li]− 2γ′n
2
− γ′n ≤ Li ≤ 2E[Li] + 2γ
′n
2
+ γ′n. (10)
which finally shows that with probability at least 1− 4e−2nγ′2 we have
E[Li]− 2γ′n ≤ Li ≤ E[Li] + 2γ′n.
A union bound over the log(u) values of i concludes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix i. Let Li = ‖HixA‖0 and Zi = ‖HixA + ϕi‖0. We let Zi|Li=t be the number of
ones in HixA + ϕi, assuming that Li = t. For any fixed value t ∈ {0, ..., n} of Li, we have
E
ϕi∼Np
[
Zi|Li=t
]
= (1− p) · t+ p(n− t) = np+ (1− 2p)t. (11)
By Lemma 6, with probability at least 1− 4 log(u)e−2γ′2n we have for all i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1
E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi] ≥ np+ (1− 2p)

 E
h∼F ,
s∼S
[Li]− 2γ′n

 (12)
E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi] ≤ np+ (1− 2p)

 E
h∼F ,
s∼S
[Li] + 2γ
′n

 (13)
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Furthermore, for any fixed Hi, let Zi|Hi denote the number of ones in HixA + ϕi, conditioned on
this choice of Hi. We note that fixing Hi is equivalent to fixing Li as Li is uniquely determined by Hi
and the input. Zi|Hi is a sum of independent random variables, where the randomness comes from the
perturbation. So for any 0 < γ∗ < 1, a Chernoff bound gives
Pr
ϕi∼Np
[
Zi|Hi > (1 + γ
∗) E
[
Zi|Hi
]
∨ Zi|Hi < (1 − γ
∗) E
[
Zi|Hi
] ]
(14)
≤ 2e−γ
∗2 E
[
Zi|
Hi
]
/3
(15)
where E
[
Zi|Hi
]
is over ϕi ∼ Np. By (11), Eϕi∼Np
[
Zi|Hi
]
≥ np for any choice of Hi, so 2e−γ∗2pn/3 is an
upper bound on (15). Moreover, (15) holds for all i = 0, ..., log(u) − 1 simultaneously with probability
at most 2 log(u)e−γ
∗2pn/3. We conclude that
Pr
ϕi∼Np
[
∀i : (1− γ∗) E
[
Zi|Hi
]
< Zi|Hi < (1 + γ
∗) E
[
Zi|Hi
] ]
(16)
≥ 1− 2 log(u)e−γ∗2pn/3 (17)
Combining (12), (13) and (17) and letting γ′ = γ∗, we have by a union bound that for all levels i
simultaneously, where the expectation is over h ∼ F and s ∼ S
Zi ≥ (1− γ′) (np+ (1− 2p) (E[Li]− 2γ′n))
Zi ≤ (1 + γ′) (np+ (1− 2p) (E[Li] + 2γ′n)) ,
with probability at least
1−
(
4 log(u)e−2nγ
′2
+ 2 log(u)e−γ
′2pn/3
)
≥ 1− 6 log(u)e−γ′2pn/3.
By Lemma 3, this is equivalent to
Zi ≥ (1− γ′) (E[Zi]− 2(1− 2p)γ′n) (18)
Zi ≤ (1 + γ′) (E[Zi] + 2(1− 2p)γ′n) . (19)
where the expectation is over h ∼ F , s ∼ S and ϕi ∼ Np. We pick a suitable γ′:
γ′ =
γp
6
⇒ 2(1− 2p)γ′n = (1− 2p)γp
3
n
⇒ 2(1− 2p)γ′n ≤ γ(1− 2p)
3
E[Zi].
Hence, let γ′ = γp6 . Inserting into (18) and (19) we have
Zi ≥
(
1− γp
6
)(
E[Zi]− γ(1− 2p)
3
E[Zi]
)
Zi ≤
(
1 +
γp
6
)(
E[Zi] +
γ(1− 2p)
3
E[Zi]
)
where E[Zi] is over h ∼ F , s ∼ S and ϕi ∼ Np.
We conclude that with this choice of γ, with probability at least 1− 6 log(u)e− γ
2p3n
62·3
(1 − γ) E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi] ≤ Zi ≤ (1 + γ) E
h∼F ,
s∼S,
ϕi∼Np
[Zi].
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A.3 Size of interval for input size
Before proving Lemma 5, we give a technical lemma:
Lemma 7. For any 0 < γ < 1
2e3
1−2p−1
any value
mˆ ∈
[
2in ln
(
1− 2p
1− 2Zi(1+γ)n
)
, 2in ln
(
1− 2p
1− 2Zi(1−γ)n
)]
(20)
satisfies
mˆ ≥ (1− η) 2in ln
(
1∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
)
mˆ ≤ (1 + η) 2in ln
(
1∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
)
for
η =
6γ
(
e3
1−2p − 1
)
(1− γ)− 2γ
(
e3
1−2p − 1
)
with probability at least 1− 6 log(u)e−γ2p3n/108 for the i where ‖w‖12in ∈ [1, 2].
Proof. By Lemma 3 ∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
=
1− 2 E[Zi]n
1− 2p
and so by Lemma 4, with probability at least 1− 6 log(u)e−γ2p3n/108 we have for any 0 < γ < 1 that for
all i = 0, ..., log(u)− 1 simultaneously.
1− 2Zi(1−γ)n
1− 2p <
∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
<
1− 2Zi(1+γ)n
1− 2p . (21)
For convenience, we consider the slightly bigger interval – note that if (21) is satisfied, then so is this
interval:
1− 2(1+γ) E[Zi](1−γ)n
1− 2p <
∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
<
1− 2(1−γ) E[Zi](1+γ)n
1− 2p ,
where the left-hand side can be reordered as(
1− 2γ
1− γ
(
1
(1 − 2p)∏j∈A (1− wj2in) − 1
))∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
(22)
and the right-hand side as(
1 +
2γ
1 + γ
(
1
(1− 2p)∏j∈A (1− wj2in) − 1
))∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
. (23)
We will bound this interval further using the following claim:
Claim. Define
β∗ :=
2γ
1− γ
(
e2+
1
2i−1n
1− 2p − 1
)
.
Whenever ‖w‖12in < 2, the interval defined by (22) and (23) is contained in
(1− β∗)∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
, (1 + β∗)
∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
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Proof of Claim. As 2γ1+γ <
2γ
1−γ , we increase (23) to(
1 +
2γ
1− γ
(
1
(1− 2p)∏j∈A (1− wj2in) − 1
))∏
j∈A
(
1− wj
2in
)
.
Observing that when ‖w‖12in ≤ 2
2γ
1− γ
(
1
(1− 2p)∏j∈A (1− wj2in) − 1
)
≤ 2γ
1− γ

e ‖w‖12in + ‖w‖1(2in)2
1− 2p − 1


≤ 2γ
1− γ
(
e2+
1
2i−1n
1− 2p − 1
)
=: β∗
we have the result.
Applying the claim, we consider the interval:
2in ln
(
1∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
)
≥ 2in ln
(
1
(1 + β∗)
∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
)
(24)
2in ln
(
1∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
)
≤ 2in ln
(
1
(1 − β∗)∏j∈A (1− wj2in)
)
. (25)
We remind the reader that by construction, this interval contains the target interval (20).
We consider the ratio between the end-points of the interval defined by (24) and (25). Observe that
2in ln
(
1
(1−β∗)
∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
2in ln
(
1
(1+β∗)
∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
) = ln
(
1∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
− ln(1− β∗)
ln
(
1∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
− ln(1 + β∗)
≤
ln
(
1∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
+ β
∗
1−β∗
ln
(
1∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
− β∗
= 1 +
β∗
(
1 + 11−β∗
)
ln
(
1∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
− β∗
where the inequality follows from
x
1 + x
≤ ln(1 + x) ≤ x, x > −1.
For β∗ < 1/2, we have
β∗
(
1 + 11−β∗
)
ln
(
1∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
− β∗
<
3β∗
ln
(
1∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
− β∗
<
3β∗
‖w‖1
2in − β∗
Observe that as ‖w‖12in increases, it gets easier to satisfy this inequality. But we remind ourselves of the
Claim, where we required ‖w‖12in < 2. So the interval in (24) and (25) does not necessarily contain the
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target interval (20) for larger values of ‖w‖12in . Assume further that
‖w‖1
2in ≥ 1. Then
3β∗
‖w‖1
2in − β∗
<
3β∗
1− β∗ .
So, we conclude that with probability at least 1 − 6 log(u)e−γ2p3n/108, any value in the target interval
(20) is within a factor 1 + 3β
∗
1−β∗ of 2
in ln
((∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
))−1)
.
Inserting the value of β∗, we obtain an estimate within a factor of
1 +
6γ
(
e
2+ 1
2i−1n
1−2p − 1
)
(1− γ)− 2γ
(
e
2+ 1
2i−1n
1−2p − 1
) < 1 + 6γ
(
e3
1−2p − 1
)
(1− γ)− 2γ
(
e3
1−2p − 1
) .
Thus it suffices that
γ <
1
2e3
1−2p − 1
.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 5:
Lemma 5. Assume ‖w‖1 > n > 1, and β > 1n . With probability at least 1− 6 log(u)e−
γ2p3n
108 there exists
an i ∈ {0, ..., log(u)− 1} such that any element from Ii(p) is a (1 + β)-approximation to ‖w‖1 for
γ <
(
β − 1n
)
(1− 2p)
7e3
.
Specifically, i where ‖w‖12in ∈ [1, 2), gives these guarantees.
Proof. We will choose γ in terms of the accuracy parameter β, such that with high probability any
estimate from the interval [
2in ln
(
1− 2p
1− 2Zi(1+γ)n
)
, 2in ln
(
1− 2p
1− 2Zi(1−γ)n
)]
(26)
is within a factor (1 + β) of ‖w‖1. We will do this in a few steps: First, we show that any value from
(26) is a good estimate of
2in ln
(
1∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
)
. (27)
As 2in ln
(
1
e
−
‖w‖1
2in
)
= ‖w‖1 and
2in ln
(
1∏
j∈A(1−
wj
2in
)
)
2in ln
(
1
e
−
‖w‖1
2in
) ≤ ln
(
e
‖w‖1
2in
+
‖w‖1
(2in)2
)
ln
(
e
‖w‖1
2in
) = 1 + 1
2in
where we used the Taylor expansion of the exponential function, we have
‖w‖1 ≤ 2in ln
(
1∏
j∈A
(
1− wj2in
)
)
≤
(
1 +
1
2in
)
‖w‖1.
So a good estimate for (27) will allow for a good estimate of ‖w‖1. The technical lemma, Lemma 7,
shows that as long as ‖w‖1 is sufficiently large, that is, there is an i such that ‖w‖12in ∈ [1, 2), we get a
suitable estimate for (27) with the interval (26) with high probability.
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Hence, any value from (26) is within a factor (1 + β) of ‖w‖1 for
γ <
(β − 1/n)(1− 2p)
7e3
<
β − 1/n
7
(
e3
1−2p − 1
) < β − 12in
7
(
e3
1−2p − 1
)
for β > 1n . We will choose n in terms of β such that this is always satisfied. Clearly, this value of γ is
significantly smaller than the requirement from Lemma 7, which concludes the proof.
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